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Abstract 
This paper examines the changing perceptions of Frelimo’s nationalist project amongst 
members of the middle class in Maputo, Mozambique’s capital. I argue that nationalism in 
Mozambique created a system of meaning and new forms of identity that are especially 
relevant for more privileged urbanites. However, growing urban poverty and inequality has 
had an effect throughout the social spectrum in Mozambique. The self-same set of nationalist 
values provides a critique for the failings of the regime as everyday life continually conflicts 
with the government’s message of unity and progress for all and this is causing a loss of 
support even among the regime’s beneficiaries.   
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Introduction 
 
This paper, although set in Maputo, gives an overview of the major insights I have 
developed concerning Mozambique through my work for the Cities and Fragile States theme 
of the Crisis States research programme. My research, based in Maputo and the northern city 
of  Nampula, has focused on the ways in which the ruling Frelimo1 party has tried since the 
end of the civil war to maintain and create support for the regime amongst a growing urban 
middle class and the social tensions that have arisen from this effort. The primary policy 
objective of Frelimo under the current president, Armando Guebuza, is to prioritise 
development efforts in rural areas, especially in the centre and north of the country, where 
the party has historically been weak. In many respects this programme appears to be on the 
way towards achieving its goal and levels of absolute poverty in rural areas are thought to be 
declining. However, the country is urbanising rapidly and by some estimations around half 
the population will live in cities by 2020. Poverty in urban areas is rising, yet since both the 
government and many of the major donors focus on rural areas, little thought has been given 
as to how to deal with this. My research highlights how urban poverty produces social 
effects beyond the misery of the poor. Gross inequality, rising crime, a perceived decline in 
social mobility and an increasingly pervasive sense of insecurity in urban areas are creating 
tensions between the party elite and the growing middle class, even though the current 
period has ushered in an unprecedented time of prosperity for these favoured social groups. 
Thus, while the Frelimo  party has probably never been so secure in its power, the tensions 
that have been manifested in the liberal period are beginning to undermine the legitimacy of 
the Frelimo nationalist project.  
 
In this paper I discuss the changing relationship of four people, who can broadly be 
described as members of Maputo’s middle class, to Frelimo’s nationalist project. My 
primary argument is that nationalism in Mozambique has created a set of values and a 
                                                 
1 Frelimo, (Mozambican Liberation Front) has ruled Mozambique continuously since independence in 1975. 
Initially they were a socialist party, which adopted Marxist-Leninism in 1977. They largely abandoned socialism 
in 1989/1990.  
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cultural system for certain favoured groups, which shaped a social and moral geography for 
the nation as well as how these groups fit into Mozambican society and how the various 
parts of the country are linked. However, while my informants may have internalised many 
of the regime’s founding values, these self-same values can also provide a critique to 
delegitimize the state’s ongoing project to ‘build a nation’ and can provide alternate and 
unexpected social and moral geographies. In the case of Mozambique this seems to have 
produced a state that is paradoxically both stable and brittle at the same time. In many ways 
this is a commonplace assertion, but I hope it provides a response to what I see as linear and 
instrumentalist tendency in much of the literature concerning ‘state-building’ and a 
mechanistic view of the relationship between elites and supporters, often based on an 
essentialised and unproblematised view of patronage and ethnic identity. Thus, the complex 
and often contradictory web of obligations, ideals and ambitions for those who seek to 
‘build’ a state and for those who seek to challenge it, boils down to the elegant simplicities 
of ‘greed and grievance’ or rational choice theory, and endless effort is devoted to charting 
what sorts of elites need to be included if the country is to avoid the dreaded signifier of 
‘fragile’ or ‘failed’. Doubtless, all these factors are crucial, but it appears to me that 
underlying systems of meaning, their inherent malleability, and the social contexts that help 
to produce and shape them largely disappear from view. It is important to understand the 
economic interests of various factions and to chart coalitions, either among elites or between 
elites and segments of the wider population. Nonetheless, without trying to understand 
systems of meaning and how they are shaped on their own terms we can offer only a partial 
story.  
 
The paper is broadly divided into three parts. The first places my argument within the 
existing literature of nationalism and the internalisation of political values and asserts that 
the geographical setting of Maputo and my informants’ relationship to the city is decisive in 
understanding shifts in nationalist identity and systems of meaning. The second introduces 
the ethnographic setting and uses life histories to trace the changing relationship of four 
informants with the city and with the nationalist project. The paper concludes with a 
description of the role of the city in shaping the systems of meaning that underlie the 
nationalist project.  
 
Nationalism, Identity and the City 
 
My insistence on the importance of Maputo in shaping nationalist identities in Mozambique 
may appear counter-intuitive. Both the liberation struggle (1964-1975) when the nation was 
forged and the post-independence civil war (1977-1992) when the nation was transformed 
seem to follow Eric Wolf’s famous pattern of ‘Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century’ 
(1968). In accordance with a well-worn pattern, both instances involved alienated elites who 
mobilised various sections of the disgruntled peasantry, either to overthrow the regime or to 
force it to make serious concessions. The actual benefit to this amorphous, ill-defined and 
deeply internally divided social group known as the peasantry is more ambiguous. It is 
difficult to say if the revolutionary government’s programme of collectivisation and its 
attempts at rapid industrialisation, or the current ‘liberal’ government’s programmes of 
structural adjustment and ‘free markets’ significantly improved the lives of many people in 
rural areas. However, especially during the revolutionary period, there was a concerted 
attempt to take some relatively poor and relatively rural people and make them neither poor 
nor rural any more. Moreover, at least during the revolutionary period, this rapid jump in 
social status was combined with a moral project and the creation of a new form of nationalist 
identity (for similar examples from the Soviet Union and China see Fitzpatrick, 1994, 1999, 
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Hoffman 1994 and Feuchtwang 2001). This process creates certain kinds of social 
geographies of nationalism, linking urban areas and the hinterlands and binding them 
together by creating new kinds of identity, opportunity and legitimacy under the overall 
rubric of ‘building the nation’.  
 
The opportunity that Frelimo created for at least some of the nation’s citizens to experience 
unprecedented social mobility remain a point of pride for the party elite, even if the lustre 
has faded from other aspects of the revolution. In May 2009, I had a conversation with 
Senhor Macamo, a man who previously held many ministerial posts and who remains a 
member of Frelimo’s powerful central committee.2 Senhor Macamo waxed lyrical about the 
opportunities created for Mozambicans during the eleven year liberation struggle (1964-
1975) and the initial post-independent period: 
 
Many people talk about how things like the expanding bureaucracy under socialism 
created opportunities, which of course it did, but that is too simplistic. The liberation 
struggle itself created tremendous social mobility and also regional, as many of these 
people came from the north. It was the struggle that brought peasants to the fore for the 
first time really. Granted these were people who usually hailed from the upper strata of 
the peasantry. They may have been poor, often little better off then their neighbours, 
but they had access to some education. People from this group became generals (we 
did not use the title at the time, but they had basically the same powers), provincial 
governors and even national directors on some occasions. This was not the classic 
model of urbanisation, they moved to cities because they already had positions and 
power, not to gain them. We created a situation where something that would normally 
take generations happened in just a decade or so. There were limits though; provinces 
like Nampula, Zambezia and Sofala were largely left out, because of their particular 
history and social structures. The elites of these places were often outside of the 
struggle and they did not gain the same benefits. Now the process is no longer as 
radical or as quick and it is usually the sons of the previous beneficiaries that use the 
existing structures. For others the process is much slower and more incremental.  
 
The process that Senhor Macamo describes almost appears as if the previous, highly 
restrictive routes of social mobility that drew a privileged few into the growing cities under 
colonialism were subjected to a strong dose of amphetamines by the liberation struggle. In 
this respect the Mozambican case appears as a post-colonial version of that described by 
Benedict Anderson for the formation of nationalism in other former colonial states in his 
celebrated ‘Imagined Communities’ (2006). For Anderson, the introduction of local elite 
schools in colonies that funnelled people into growing colonial bureaucracies created a 
pilgrimage or social route that tied opportunities, common experiences and loyalties to a 
specific territory. In Mozambique, the process of creating a ‘pilgrimage’ that brought people 
from relatively disadvantaged areas to the summit of power in Maputo as part of a wider 
revolution to create the nation, did not simply create a nationalist elite but also a crucial 
pillar of legitimation for their project. However, while this process formed a nationalist 
subject that provided a firm base of support for Frelimo, the binding together of a moral 
project with loyalty, adherence to a specific set of values, identity and territory, does not 
simply happen and then become frozen in time.  As this paper will demonstrate, while many 
people may have internalised the regime’s founding values, which led to new forms of 
identity, the twists and turns, compromises and corruptions, disillusionments and betrayals 
                                                 
2 All names used for informants in this paper are pseudonyms.  
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that have followed independence in Mozambique have allowed these identities to evolve in 
unexpected directions. These directions have loosened the bonds between Frelimo and its 
followers and even between supporters and the nation that Frelimo embodies.  
 
In Fitzpatrick’s extensive historical work on Stalinism, she points out that while overall 
living conditions may have worsened during Stalin’s ‘revolution from above’, it also created 
extraordinary conditions of social mobility for many young people, especially those from 
worker or peasant backgrounds (1979, 1999, 2000). Therefore, despite the brutal and 
repressive nature of the regime, it also created a social base that actively implemented the 
state’s policies since cadres were self-interested beneficiaries. However, this formulation is 
not without its limitations, as noted by Hellbeck: “Implicit in the term ‘self-interest’ or in the 
question of what people ‘really’ thought is an assumption of a transcendental self, lacking 
historical specificity…” (2000:78). Kotkin addresses these issues in his work by 
understanding Stalinism as a ‘civilisational’ and fluid cultural system (1995). Instead of 
viewing the Soviet population simply as dupes, or self-interested agents of the regime, he 
points out that many people actively internalised the regime’s values creating an 
empowering, if demanding new identity (1995: 223). While such an identity can demand 
tremendous self-sacrifice, it does not imply unthinking obedience though, as pointed out by 
Hellback, it also created the possibility for dissidence as the rhetoric of a particular regime 
appears to be far removed from the actual, day to day, practice of power. (Hellback 
2000:111).    
 
Frelimo’s nationalist project differed from Stalin’s in many ways. The prime victims of 
Stalin’s early period, kulaks and the petty-bourgeoisie, were often the major beneficiaries in 
the Mozambican revolution. Frelimo also had powerful security services, ‘re-education’ 
camps for dissidents, and as the civil war worsened, a growing reliance on coercion.    Yet 
despite their best efforts, the party lacked the power, the state apparatus and the time to enact 
such a dramatic social revolution. Nonetheless, Frelimo’s revolutionary nationalist ideology 
was also a civilisational and cultural project, even if it did not cast its net as far as the Soviet 
Union did. As I have written elsewhere (Sumich 2009), revolutionary nationalism had its 
origins in the particular social background of much of the party leadership and their 
relatively weak ties to so-called ‘traditional’ culture.  Beyond the party’s Marxist 
intelligentsia, it is doubtful that the intricacies of socialist theory were widely understood. 
Exploitation was not conceptualised as the result of social relations created by a mode of 
production, but instead as a manifestation of wickedness (Hall and Young 1997). Frelimo’s 
socialism, therefore, was an attempt to vanquish this evil and create a ‘good’ and pure 
society. For the leadership, this effort demanded the abolition of the ‘feudal’ structures of 
patriarchal chiefly leadership, the destruction of ethnic and regional identities, and the 
suppression of the ‘superstitious’ beliefs that had supposedly left the population ‘primitive’ 
and docile. In practice this project was elitist in conception and top-down in implementation, 
but for the initiated, it was also a deeply moral vision that would unite a fractured population 
and lead the way to overcoming the legacies of colonial rule - poverty, backwardness and 
humiliation. For the believers this involved the internalisation of new values, social 
structures and an understanding of Mozambique’s diverse peoples, their connections and 
their place in the wider world.  This was a cultural system that unified the party’s cadres in 
the face of ever growing challenges to their rule. Despite Frelimo’s Maoist inflected rhetoric, 
with its distrust of established urbanites and the official lauding of the peasantry, this 
cultural system was also deeply urban in its outlook. Collectivisation was not simply 
supposed to aid in the extension of social services to the peasantry and rationalise 
agricultural production, but above all it would extend Frelimo’s value system to the 
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‘backward’ elements of the population and create ‘cities in the bush’ (Hall and Young 1997). 
The role of actual urban areas, as opposed to embryonic dream cities in the bush, was even 
more concrete. Here was the centre of power and culture and the pilgrimage of a party 
member from a dusty district seat to Maputo was akin to the goal of creating the homem 
novo (new man), the embodiment of a new, and truly national Mozambican personality.  
 
Tilly (1994) has argued that cities played a vital role in the formation of European nation-
states . With respect to Africa, Freund has pointed out that whilst cities may not have created 
a sense of national identity, it was in urban areas where this identity would be most relevant 
(Freund 2007:91).  Cities, as the areas where power and wealth are concentrated, are vital 
points on the social ‘map’ of the nationalist imagination. It is here that people from diverse 
social and geographical origins come to live and the dream of national unity either comes 
true or becomes a nightmare. Castells asserts that cities are simply ‘containers of social and 
class relationships’ (quoted in Merrifield 2006: 101), but as shown by Harvey (2006) for 
Paris and Holston (1989) for Brasília, cities are also deeply implicated in shaping these 
relationships, albeit sometimes in unexpected ways. The sets of social relations that grow 
from urban areas help shape forms of nationalist identity and it is where contacts with the 
world outside of the nation’s borders are concentrated. This is certainly true in the case of 
Maputo. As the capital and largest city (with an estimated population of 1,094,315, more 
than twice its nearest rival), Maputo is the undisputed centre of wealth and power in 
Mozambique. As a city, Maputo was crucial to the post-independence formation of a 
nationalist identity and it has also been at the centre of the changes to that identity that have 
accompanied the waning of the revolution.  
 
The Ethnographic Context 
 
On 5th February 2008 a riot broke out in Maputo, a Frelimo stronghold, the first since 
independence. The riots were blamed on the rising price of transport, which was forcing 
many urbanites to spend half their salary or more just to get to work. Price hikes in fuel also 
meant that the price of food, much of which is imported, was also spiralling. While these 
factors, combined with rising crime, gross inequality, growing urban poverty and an 
increasingly unpopular president were well-known, the violence seemed to catch everybody, 
including many of the participants, by surprise. Initially mobs attacked chapas, the mini-van 
taxis that are a ubiquitous feature of urban life in Mozambique, overturning and burning 
them. Wider frustrations soon came to the fore and groups of people started targeting those 
driving luxury cars, the symbol of the new rich, and also burned down a school named after 
the current president, Armando Guebuza. However, despite such symbolic attacks on the 
president, this was not necessarily an anti-government revolt. One rumour that circulated 
endlessly claimed that the rioters attacked a convoy of luxury cars, but when they found that 
the convoy contained the former president, Joaquim Chissano, they started cheering and 
demanded that he re-take power. It seemed that the rioters were more intent on reminding 
Frelimo that they also shared the city and were suffering, rather than being aimed at 
overthrowing the regime. This sentiment was voiced by a young rioter who was interviewed 
on the evening news. When asked why he resorted to violence and the destruction of 
property, his reply was: ‘They [the government] think they can cut us off, well we can cut 
too!’. The riot continued for two days and shut the city down. It was only quelled when the 
government deployed contingents of police with permission to shoot on sight, and made a 
panicked agreement to subsidise the cost of transport. Estimates vary, but a common tally 
was 32 people killed, many shot by the police. 
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 The February 5th  riot is the most dramatic indication that the social contract between the 
rulers and the ruled is being broken. It also appears that this sentiment is felt most intensely  
by those who have been historically close to the regime and amongst its major beneficiaries 
and who see themselves as squeezed between the corrupt arrogance of the rich and the 
violent fury of the poor. The reasons given for this situation depend on who one speaks to.  
They range from growing inequality, Guebuza’s penchant to ignore urban areas in favour of 
extending Frelimo’s reach into the parts of the countryside where the party has historically 
been weak, rampant corruption and a loss of vision and purpose on the part of the party. The 
rioters were pointing out in particular that Frelimo’s loudly proclaimed goals of unity, 
progress and a better life for all are nowhere in evidence.  Many members of the elite are 
well aware of the growing frustration and are caught between sympathy and the fear that 
they will be targeted the next time a riot erupts. As I was told by Senhor Marques, a member 
of the central committee and a former minister: 
 
The future is uncertain. The old leadership of Frelimo has kept its unity even though 
there are many internal conflicts, but I can’t say how long that will continue. There are 
a lot of big projects coming in, but they don’t create jobs. There has been a huge 
increase in the number of universities, but there is nowhere for the young to go. They 
are becoming increasingly frustrated and, unlike their elders, they are not attached to 
Frelimo in the same way. Even within Frelimo, the party machine is now just being 
mobilised for elections, we do not actually listen to the base. Chissano [the former 
president] gave people the freedom to do what they want; now the party is becoming 
increasingly autocratic. Guebuza will win the next election without a doubt, but the 
party is looking at serious challenges ten years down the line. The 5th of February can 
easily happen again.   
 
 
It is against this social backdrop that I want to introduce the four primary informants for this 
paper and their changing relationship with the nationalist project.  All four can loosely be 
defined as members of an urban middle class, with high levels of education and professional 
jobs, and all four, in divergent ways, owe much of their social position to the revolution. Of 
the four, I have known two since I first started fieldwork in Maputo in 2002. For one, 
Naema, I am well acquainted with her family and she has met members of my own. I have 
celebrated holidays, birthdays and major rituals at their house and have been well positioned 
to watch their changing attitudes. I have known Varyna for an equal amount of time and 
have visited her house on multiple occasions. In this case, however, I am much less well 
acquainted with her wider family, largely due to the fact that her mother is convinced that I 
am a CIA agent and was always wary in my presence. Pascal I have known for three years 
and as he is a relatively recent immigrant to Maputo, the only things I know about his wider 
family is what he has told me. Chuabo, the final informant, I met in 2009 and our 
interactions thus far have been restricted to more official interviews and the collection of life 
histories.  
 
The first life history, that of Senhor Chuabo, provides an example of the kind of social 
mobility that characterised the revolutionary period. This combined the prospect of 
advancement with a moral project that tightly bound Chaubo’s fate to the revolution and the 
nation. The next two histories, Naema and Varyna will demonstrate how values internalised 
from the nationalist project are now becoming ‘de-territorialised’. In his analysis of the late 
Soviet period, Yurchak(2006:114-115) describes de-territorialisation as the process in 
which:  
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...the routine replication of authoritative discourse enabled new identities, socialities, 
and forms of knowledge that were enabled but not determined by the authoritative 
rhetoric. This internal displacement of the system’s dominant discourse was different  
from the dissident kind of opposition and was not articulated in oppositional terms; 
indeed it did not preclude one from feeling personal affinity to many of the values that 
were explicitly and implicitly central to the socialist system. 
 
In the case of my informants, de-territorialisation not only describes the ways in which 
nationalist values create new forms of identity, but in a more literal sense, these forms of 
identity are becoming progressively unmoored not only from the nationalist project that 
created them but from the territorial confines of the nation that once gave them sustenance. 
The final example is that of Pascal, the youngest of the informants mentioned here and 
perhaps the first to have to deal with the reversal of the process of social mobility that he had 
been taught to expect as normal.  
 
Chuabo 
 
I first met Chuabo at his office, a large converted house in one of the most expensive parts of 
the city. While he lacks the ability to launch into asides in fluent English like so many 
members of the elite, he shares their self-confident and prosperous air. This is not surprising, 
considering the startling mobility that has characterised his life; through the revolution he 
has become an unqualified success. Chuabo was born the year the liberation struggle began 
in the far north, in one of the poorest and most remote provinces in Mozambique. He was 
raised by his grandparents as his mother and father worked in Zambia for much of his 
childhood. His village was near an Anglican Mission that also had the best school in the 
area. Most of the students, including Chuabo, came from rural backgrounds, but due to the 
education they received and the opportunities created after the revolution, many 
subsequently became high-level cadres. In 1977 Frelimo negotiated a deal with Fidel Castro, 
which allowed one thousand Mozambican students (a hundred from each province) to obtain 
their secondary education in Cuba. The best students were selected, often those from 
relatively disadvantaged backgrounds and Chuabo, was picked to go. He went to Maputo for 
orientation and this was the first time he interacted with people his own age from all over the 
country. They were then sent to a specially constructed school that Chuabo described as 
similar to a seminary, as it was an enclosed compound far from any town. After graduation 
Chuabo, as well as many of the other students, was offered the chance to study at university 
in Cuba where he took a degree in economic statistics. He finally returned to Mozambique in 
1985 and was assigned to a position with the National Directory of Finance and Planning. 
 
During his time in Cuba, Chuabo had become a believer in the socialist ideal. He was deeply 
impressed by the way the Cuban leadership lived with apparent simplicity, and how social 
differentiation seemed to be insignificant. His return to Mozambique after eight years proved 
to be disillusioning. Everything with conducted in a top-down manner. It was impossible to 
do something without the consent of someone higher up; therefore no one really did 
anything. Furthermore, unlike his experience in Cuba, the social gap between the leadership, 
with their myriad of privileges, and the wider population was large and accentuated by 
growing corruption. He eventually quit government service and went to Maputo to study 
law. Senhor Macamo (the former minister mentioned in the introduction) was his lecturer 
and after graduation he joined Macamo’s firm and is now a partner. His wife is also a 
professional and he has been able to send his children abroad to study. Although he has 
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doubts about some of the directions in which Frelimo seems to be heading, he is still loyal to 
the party and deeply grateful for all of the opportunities it provided him. Under Frelimo a 
process of social mobility that might have taken generations under different circumstances 
was shortened to mere decades. The party gave Chuabo an identity as part of a wider moral 
project; he went from being a relatively well-educated peasant to a member of the vanguard 
and someone being groomed for positions of leadership. This created a social pilgrimage that 
involved a gradual journey from one of the nation’s most remote provinces to a position of 
privilege within Maputo itself, with his fortunes intertwined with that of the revolution. 
Chuabo is the epitome of a process that created a nationalist identity and bound a generation 
of cadres closely to the party, but which is also a process that is becoming difficult to 
replicate in the current era.    
 
Varyna 
 
I first met Varyna in 2002. She was born just a few years after the revolution and her family 
is well-connected with Frelimo. Varyna’s father is a southerner from an assimilado family 
(the assimilated, the highest position available for blacks during the colonial period) and had 
been a soldier with Frelimo during the liberation struggle, later rising to the position of 
director of a state company during the socialist period.3 Varyna’s mother, also from an 
assimilado family, is from the north and after the struggle she was able to get an education, 
rising to a high state position. Varyna’s childhood was privileged; she studied at an 
International School and became fluent in English. Then, after the end of apartheid, she 
studied in South Africa. When she returned to Mozambique after university she worked at a 
ministry. The pay was low, about $300 per month, but she did make contacts in the NGO 
sector. She later won a scholarship to undertake a Master’s degree in the UK and upon her 
return to Mozambique she obtained a much better paid position with the UN and was 
promoted to head  of the regional office abroad.  
 
Much like Chuabo, Varyna is bright and hard-working and both owe many of the 
opportunities they have enjoyed to the victory of the revolution. Unlike Chuabo, however, 
her nationalist identity did not come about through a gradual progression, nor was it 
something that needed to be struggled for; she has never thought of herself as anything other 
than Mozambican and a citizen of a sovereign nation. She champions many of the party’s 
modernist goals and has little sympathy for ethnic and regional fault-lines and rivalries. She 
feels that witchcraft is a divisive superstition of the ignorant and she also attaches immense 
value to education and the ideal of progress. While she has some sympathy for Frelimo, it is 
more to do with class status and family connections. On the occasions when she actually 
talks about local politics, she usually holds the party in good natured contempt. She 
personally does not think there would be many significant changes were the Renamo4 
opposition to win. The opportunities Chuabo enjoyed came through the consolidation of the 
nationalist project and are firmly based on his connections in Mozambique and the party. 
Varyna’s on the other hand are becoming progressively more de-territorialised. Her family’s 
relationship to Frelimo may have started her on her path, but now she is more dependent on 
the vagaries of the UN bureaucracy than the favour of the party that no longer has a moral 
claim for her allegiance. Increasingly she sees herself as part of an international middle 
class, with whom she often has more in common than many of her own countrymen. In some 
ways Varyna represents the triumph of the nationalist project, the creation of a truly 
                                                 
3 See Hedges 1999, Mondlane 1969 and Penvenne 1989 for a more detailed description of the legal category of 
assmilação the role of assimilados in late colonial Mozambique. 
4 Renamo (Mozambican National Resistance) are the former rebels who are now the main opposition party. 
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Mozambican subject with an aversion for the ‘backwardness’ and divisiveness of the past, 
who supports the need for a strong and perhaps fierce state to safeguard the overriding ideal 
of unity. While she believes in nationalist values, they also provide a ready-made critique as 
rhetoric appears ever more divorced from reality.     
    
Naema 
 
Naema was born in the mid-1960s in a northern provincial capital. Her mother is a 
Mozambican of Indian descent and her father was a Portuguese settler. Early in her 
childhood the family was thrown into poverty after her father was arrested for running guns 
for Frelimo during the liberation struggle. They were able to stay with some well-off family 
members in Maputo, who supported them and arranged for Naema to attend school. Naema 
was in secondary school at independence and she became a party supporter and student 
activist. After graduation, she qualified as a teacher and was sent to the north. She then met 
her husband, João, who was a soldier. João is also of Indian descent and from the same 
province. His father had been a merchant running a ‘bush’ shop that sold matches and soap 
to villagers. During the liberation struggle he sided with Frelimo and was awarded a 
government post in the provincial capital after liberation. João joined the party and was 
briefly a member of the presidential guard until he was dismissed for insubordination. They 
later moved to Maputo where Naema secured another teaching position. Her salary was 
inadequate for their growing family and João lacked the necessary papers to find work, so he 
survived by doing odd jobs. Naema now describes this period as the tempo da fome, or the 
time of hunger. Their fortunes have improved considerably since the fall of socialism and 
the end of the civil war. Naema now teaches for a private school, which pays around 10 
times the salary of a state-run secondary school. João formed a company, and the business is 
prospering. They were able to buy their apartment when the government privatised housing 
and have since sold it and bought a quinta  (a country house) in an outlying suburb with a 
garden large enough to raise some crops. All four of their children have had private 
educations; three have gone on to university and the youngest should start next year.  
 
Surprisingly though, their rising prosperity has been matched by increasing alienation from 
the regime. Despite the fact that her husband is a party member and her eldest daughter a 
candidate member, Naema feels that the leadership is morally bankrupt, and Frelimo is 
largely composed of corrupt, murdering thieves. João is also a strong critic of the 
government, although he remains a firm supporter of the first, socialist president, Samora 
Machel. According to him, during the time of Samora, the government was not populated 
with self-interested thieves, but sincerely concerned with the plight of the people and the 
revolution had a deeply moral base. Neither of them sympathises with Renamo. João fought 
against them in the civil war and they both have the standard view of the opposition in 
Maputo, that Renamo is a party of ignorant killers. However, Naema often argues that it is 
Renamo who brought democracy and they should be given credit for ending the outright 
dictatorship. Their alienation with the Frelimo regime also coincides with a growing fear of 
the wider population. During the revolution, Frelimo championed a militantly non-racial 
line, but that has begun to fade with the introduction of the more populist logic of electoral 
democracy. The Indian population is often resented. They were one of the big economic 
winners of the post-socialist period and are frequently accused of discrimination and 
exploitation. This resentment has been matched by sometimes venomous outbursts of 
racism. Naema once told me the problem with blacks is: “Their hearts are as dark as their 
skin”. One of the reasons they left the city centre is to ensure their safety. However, their 
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hostility towards the majority population tends to be directed to those outside their social 
circle. 
 
As the nationalist project fades as a goal worth defending for Naema and her family, it is 
being replaced by a growing emphasis on Islam. They were always believers but the family 
has become noticeably more devout since I first met them in 2002. João has stopped 
drinking - a pastime he used to enjoy heartily - and he now attends the mosque five times a 
day. Their daughters have slowly begun to abandon the fashions of choice for young women 
in Maputo in favour of more ‘Islamic’ garb. When speaking about Islam to me, which they 
do with increasing regularity, they stress the purity and universality of the Umma, the sense 
of belonging to what is, by definition, a moral project and an oasis in a corrupt world. They 
are also beginning to re-orient themselves to the East. After their unsuccessful efforts to 
arrange for their children to study in South Africa or Europe, a common strategy among the 
upwardly mobile in Maputo, they are making plans for their eldest son to study in India or 
Pakistan, countries they have never visited. Additionally they have arranged a marriage 
between their eldest daughter and a Mozambican Indian who lives in Kuwait, a man she has 
never met in a country she has never seen. It is doubtful they would have considered this 
option seven years ago and they are still circumspect about it. It was only a relative who told 
me that their eldest daughter had never actually seen her fiancé and had simply exchanged 
emails with him. Unlike the de-territorialisation of opportunity experienced by Varyna, 
Naema and her family are undergoing a de-territorialisation of morality. They still consider 
themselves to be Mozambicans but their place in a nation that they see as increasingly 
corrupt and hostile is uncertain and the purity promised by the earlier nationalist vision 
disappeared long ago. Instead they align themselves with a different vision of belonging, a 
specifically international Umma.      
           
Pascal 
 
Pascal was born during the civil war and was raised outside a provincial capital in the south. 
His father was from the north and joined the liberation struggle. He became a police officer 
after independence and was rising rapidly though the ranks. However, he had vague 
connections to the losing side of an internal power struggle and his career stagnated. Pascal’s 
mother is a primary school teacher, also from the north. Her family has also been involved 
with Frelimo since the independence struggle and her brother eventually rose to the rank of 
General. Pascal did extremely well in school and won a scholarship to study at Universidade 
Eduardo Mondlane, the most elite public institution in the country. He graduated in 2007 
with very high marks but, like most from his discipline who graduated with him, he has been 
unable to get any sort of permanent job. Pascal has had three job interviews, but after each 
he was always taken aside by the interviewer and asked if he has a party card. When he 
replied that he did not, he has always been told to “deal with it”. Initially Pascal was not 
willing to compromise his principles; he feels that Frelimo is ossified, corrupt and dictatorial 
and he had no interest in being a member. However, as his period of unemployment 
persisted, Pascal began to reconsider, as did just about everyone he knew in university. The 
party leadership is increasingly worried about opening their ranks simply to what they call 
‘careerists’ and the already arduous procedure of becoming a member is becoming even 
more restrictive.  
 
The best opportunity for Pascal currently is with the Ministry of Education. The government 
policy under the current president, Guebuza, is to build ‘poles of development’ in the rural 
areas. If Pascal managed to make the right connections with the ministry there is a good 
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chance that he could be assigned work in the districts. It is not an option that Pascal relishes; 
in fact he sees it as a step backwards. He would often joke: “yeah it would be great; I could 
have dinner with the head of the district, the commandant of the police and the other local 
aristocrats and plot how to get out”. Unlike Varyna and Naema, Pascal is undergoing a 
process of re-territorialisation, a reverse of the social pilgrimage he has been taught to 
expect. Since independence, hard work and educational success were supposed to allow one 
a gradual progression from the hinterland and small towns to the capital. Now, it appears the 
opposite is true and he is in danger of being expelled from Maputo and sent to some far-off 
district seat. During the socialist period Frelimo had a tradition of sending high-ranking 
members to provincial posts as trouble-shooters, but the opportunities open to Pascal are 
widely considered to be dull and unrewarding. The lack of social mobility for those outside 
the chosen few is combined with, in Pascal’s view, the dictatorship of a self-serving elite. 
For him, the moral basis and legitimacy Frelimo claim for their nationalist project is simple 
hypocrisy.  
 
The lives of all four of the people I described have been connected to the revolution. They, 
or members of their family have been party members, served in the government, the army or 
the police and all four have benefitted from independence. Historically, it is people with 
similar experiences who have formed a bastion of support for the Frelimo party and none of 
them, even the most embittered, necessarily wants Renamo to win. Furthermore none expect 
the regime to fall in the near future. In fact, some, like Chuabo, remain deeply committed to 
Frelimo, even if they have many personal doubts. All of them are examples of Frelimo’s 
crowning achievement as all, in divergent ways, have internalised the values associated with 
the nationalist project and that has become a basis for their identity. However, as Chuabo’s 
generation begins the gradual process of retiring from public life, the nationalist project 
appears to be progressively hollowing itself out. For the younger generation, these same 
nationalist values provide a mirror to reflect the regime’s failings. While none of them is 
necessarily opposed to the party and they are among the most privileged people in the 
nation, Chuabo alone is an active supporter.  For elites to secure their power they need 
committed followers and as the violence of 5th February 2008 demonstrated, the disaffection 
of the less privileged may be growing much faster.  
 
Conclusion: The City, the Nation and Systems of Meaning 
 
In the early post-independence period Frelimo liked to claim that the ‘new man’- a truly 
Mozambican citizen based on self-sacrifice, collective labour and rationality - had been 
forged in the ‘liberated zones’, areas under Frelimo’s control during the liberation struggle 
(Vieira 1977). The reality of these claims, as opposed to the party’s nostalgic view and the 
actual unity of purpose amongst the population in the struggle, are open to debate (Hall and 
Young 1997, Newitt 1995). However, in the cities, especially Maputo where the party’s 
power and personnel are concentrated, Frelimo’s nationalist project did help to create a 
system of meaning and a set of values that was internalised by at least certain social groups 
that became bastions of the regime. However, it is also in Maputo where the failings of the 
nationalist project are most apparent. This creates a paradox whereby the population of the 
city has internalised nationalist values, identity and systems of meaning more concretely 
than many other parts of the nation, but also where the everyday shortcomings at the highest 
levels of the party are most visible and open to critique by the self-same set of values. 
 
The four case studies I have presented in this paper are meant to give a sense on a personal 
level of how nationalism in Mozambique created a system of meaning and how that system  
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is beginning to change. Whilst I do not claim to have represented the entire population of 
Maputo, my goal has been to show the unintended and counter-intuitive effects of 
developmental interventions that are masked in the standard language of ‘service delivery’, 
‘stake holders’ and ‘policy making’. The Mozambican government and the major donors 
probably never intended  to undermine the regime in its stronghold, by focusing on rural 
poverty and neglecting urban areas. Furthermore, it is unlikely that either of them expected 
to lose support from among those who have been the major beneficiaries of the economic 
transformation of the past decade or more. Urban poverty, however, does not just affect the 
poor but has social effects across the entire urban spectrum. I do not consider that Frelimo is 
in great danger, in fact the party is arguably the most important factor linking individual 
citizens to a place called Mozambique. None of the people I have mentioned hold 
themselves in opposition to the regime, yet few would support it either.  There is a danger 
that the party’s impressive façade is being steadily hollowed out as crucial social groups 
begin a long process of withdrawal and their logical successors are by no means apparent.  
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